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This study experimentally tests the effect of information transparency on the probability of 
coordination failure in global games with finite signals. Prior theory has shown that in global games 
with unique equilibrium, the effect of information transparency is ambiguous.  We find that in global 
games where the signal space is finite, increased transparency has two effects.  First, increasing the 
level of transparency usually destroys uniqueness and precipitates multiple equilibria, so that the 
effect of transparency on coordination depends crucially upon which equilibrium is actually attained.  
Second, the level of transparency determines which of these equilibria is risk dominant. We find that 
increased transparency facilitates coordination only if it switches the risk-dominant equilibrium from 
the secure equilibrium to the efficient equilibrium.  When the converse is true, improved 
transparency can be dysfunctional because it increases the probability of coordination failure.    
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Information Transparency and Coordination Failure: 






Economic settings with strategic complementarities and complete information are usually 
plagued by multiple equilibria.  There is an efficient, Pareto superior, equilibrium and an inferior, but 
secure, equilibrium.  The multiplicity of equilibria creates strategic uncertainty, in that each 
individual player is unsure which equilibrium others are playing.  Coordination failure occurs when 
players are unable to coordinate their actions to attain the Pareto superior equilibrium.  Diamond and 
Dybvig (1983) argue that bank runs are a consequence of such coordination failures.  But, the 
harmful effects of coordination failure are not confined to macro-economic phenomena.  It is also a 
pervasive management problem.  Consider the case of a firm undertaking a strategic initiative to 
improve, say, customer satisfaction. Successful implementation of the program depends on the 
actions of individuals and departments at every level of the organization. Each manager must decide 
whether to commit scarce resources to the program. Even a small loss of confidence that others will 
stay the course to achieve the Pareto superior equilibrium can lead to the individual defection of 
every agent, resulting in coordination failure.  Thus a promising initiative could fail. 
Cooper, DeJong, Forsythe, and Ross (1990) provide experimental evidence that even in 
simple two-person coordination games with complete information, the Pareto superior equilibrium is 
not guaranteed.  Van Huyck, Battalio and Beil (1990) found that when the number of players is large 
coordination failure is almost certain to occur. In another experiment, Van Huyck, Battalio, and Beil 
(1991) examine equilibrium selection in an average opinion game with secure and efficient 
equilibria. They find that subjects converge to the efficient equilibrium only when the secure 
equilibrium is rendered non-salient, and vice versa. When both strategies are salient, neither 
equilibrium is supported.    2
Carlsson and Van Damme (1993) argued that the multiplicity of equilibria in coordination 
games is an artifact of the assumption that the payoff structure of every player is common 
knowledge.  They studied a global game structure, where Nature first randomly chooses the 
coordination game to be played from a subclass of 2 X 2 games and then each player observes a 
noisy, idiosyncratic, signal of the selected game.  They established that in such global games the 
equilibrium is unique, and that as the noise in player’s observations vanishes, the sequence of unique 
equilibria converges to the risk dominant equilibrium of the game actually selected by Nature.  Thus, 
if games of complete information are viewed as limits of games with incomplete information, then 
risk dominance, as proposed by Harsanyi and Selten (1988), is a compelling equilibrium selection 
criterion.  Global games have been used to study many macroeconomic phenomena such as currency 
attacks (Morris and Shin, 1998), premature foreclosure of loans (Morris and Shin, 2004) and bank 
runs (Goldstein and Pauzner, 2005).  Morris and Shin (2003) provides an excellent overview of 
global game applications.  The common finding in these studies is that even though the multiplicity 
of equilibrium problem disappears, there is still a non-empty region of fundamentals where 
inefficient equilibria are attained due to lack of coordination.    
  The motivation for our paper is twofold.  First, we provide experimental evidence on 
whether increasing the transparency of information received by individual agents in global games 
increases or decreases the region of inefficiency where coordination failure occurs.  The importance 
of this question is apparent from the empirical observation that most public incidents of coordination 
failure are accompanied by a clamor for increased transparency.  Morris and Shin (2004) were the 
first to pose this problem.  They established that when uniqueness of equilibrium is preserved, the 
effect of increased transparency is ambiguous, and there are parameter values where increased 
transparency of information actually increases the incidence of coordination failure.  We add to the 
Morris and Shin result by studying settings where increasing the transparency of information 
destroys uniqueness and precipitates multiple equilibria.  The uniqueness of equilibrium in global 
games depends upon smooth variation in the beliefs of individual players as signals vary.  In many   3
situations, especially those arising in corporate management settings, the space of fundamentals over 
which there is uncertainty and the set of signals from which agents draw is finite.  In such finite 
settings, there are discrete jumps in players’ beliefs and it is easy to find examples where increased 
transparency of information destroys uniqueness of equilibrium and precipitates multiple equilibria.  
In these cases, increased transparency induces an equilibrium selection problem.  Therefore, the 
effect of increasing the transparency of information received by agents depends crucially upon which 
equilibrium is actually selected. Our second objective is to shed light on the equilibrium selection 
problem in global game settings with finite signals where multiple equilibria occur.  We provide 
experimental evidence that players in the global game converge rapidly to the equilibrium that is risk 
dominant in an “otherwise identical” game where fundamental uncertainty remains but there is no 
uncertainty about the beliefs of other players.     
  Our experiments are based on the Morris and Shin (2004) model of loan foreclosure 
decisions.  We run experiments where the multiple equilibria generated by increased transparency 
consists of both an efficient equilibrium and an inefficient equilibrium.  In some of our treatments, 
increased transparency makes the efficient equilibrium risk dominant in the “otherwise identical” 
game, while in other treatments increased transparency makes the inefficient equilibrium risk 
dominant.  We find that in all our treatments, subjects converge rapidly to the risk dominant 
equilibrium, regardless of whether it is efficient or inefficient.  Thus, we conclude that increased 
transparency is socially desirable only when it also makes the efficient equilibrium risk dominant.  In 
cases where the inefficient equilibrium becomes risk dominant, increased transparency is socially 
undesirable.  
Heinemann, Nagel, and Ockenfels (2004) present related experimental evidence on the 
importance of risk dominance in equilibrium selection.  They compare equilibria in complete 
information currency attack games where the state is publicly revealed, to equilibria in global games 
where each player receives a noisy private signal of the state.  In the former setting there are multiple 
equilibria, while in the global game setting there is a unique equilibrium characterized by a threshold   4
signal above which players attack the currency peg.  Their experimental finding is that players 
converge to a unique threshold strategy in both settings.  Moreover the threshold adopted in the 
public information setting is close to the unique threshold implied by vanishing signal noise in the 
corresponding global game.  Thus players appear to coordinate on the risk dominant equilibrium in 
the public information game, and other equilibrium selection criteria do not have as much 
explanatory power.  Anctil, Dickhaut, Kanodia, and Shapiro (ADKS, 2004) also examine the role of 
information in global games. They find that the efficient equilibrium emerges when the prior public 
information is sufficiently optimistic; and the secure equilibrium emerges when this information is 
not optimistic. They conjecture that information plays a role because it influences which equilibrium 
is risk dominant. The results of our study indicate that the conjecture made in ADKS is indeed 
correct.   
  The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II we provide the theory 
underlying our experiments.  In Section III we describe our experimental design, experimental 
procedures and the specific parameters used in our treatments. Section IV describes our experimental 
results, and Section V concludes the paper. 
 
II. The Loan Foreclosure Game with Finite Signals 
Consider a finite number of creditors (there are eight creditors in each of our experiments) 
who must each independently decide whether to rollover or foreclose a loan that was earlier made to 
finance a risky project.  There are three possible states, bankrupt (B), uncertain (U) and solvent (S).  
In state B the project fails regardless of what creditors do, and any creditor who rolls over her loan 
receives a payoff of zero.  In state S, the project succeeds regardless of creditors’ actions and any 
creditor who rolls over her loan receives a payoff  R > 0.  In state U, the project succeeds if and only 
if at least z < 8 of the 8 creditors roll over their loans, in which case creditors who roll over each 
receive the payoff  R.  In all three states, any creditor who forecloses receives a secure payoff   λ,     5
0 < λ < R, regardless of what other creditors do.  Thus, as depicted below, creditors play one of the 
three possible games indexed by the state.  For expositional ease, we describe the payoffs for two 
person games – the extension to 8 player games is straight forward. 
Game B 
 Rollover  Foreclose 
Rollover 0,  0  0,  λ 






 Rollover  Foreclose 
Rollover R,  R  0,  λ 
Foreclose  λ, 0  λ, λ 
  
Game S 
 Rollover  Foreclose 
Rollover R,  R  R,  λ 
Foreclose  λ, R  λ, λ 
 
Since foreclose is a dominant action in Game B and rollover is a dominant action in Game S, the 
Nash equilibrium is unique in these games.  However Game U has two Nash equilibria, {rollover, 
rollover} and {foreclose, foreclose}, with the former being Pareto superior.  If Game U is being 
played and the {foreclose, foreclose} equilibrium is attained, there is coordination failure. 
  However, players do not know which of the three games is being played.  Nature makes this 
choice with probabilities π π π BUS ,, ,  respectively.  Each player independently receives one of 
three signals, l, m, or h  that is informative about Nature’s choice. The conditional probabilities of 
these signals are described in Table 1 below: 
                 6
Table 1 
STATES 
B U S 
    l    rB    0   0 
  SIGNALS  m 1-  rB    1  1-rS 
    h    0    0   rS  
 
Given the conditional probabilities in Table I, any player receiving signal l knows for certain that 
state B has occurred, but cannot rule out the possibility that some of the other players have received 
signal m.  Similarly, any player receiving signal h knows for certain that state S has occurred, but 
cannot rule the possibility that some of the other players have received signal m.  Signal m 
communicates noisy information about the state, and any player receiving signal m cannot rule out 
the possibility that the other players may have received any of the three signals l, m or h.  Thus, 
players receiving either signal l or h have no fundamental uncertainty, but do face strategic 
uncertainty, while players receiving signal m face both fundamental and strategic uncertainty. We 
chose this probability structure to keep the global game simple and to facilitate the manipulation of 
information transparency. 
We restrict attention to pure strategy symmetric Nash equilibria.  A pure strategy for each 
player is a function σ(.) specifying an action contingent on each signal.  Since signal l communicates 
that state B has occurred for certain and since foreclose is a dominant action in state B, σ(l) = 
foreclose must be part of any equilibrium strategy profile.  Similarly, since receipt of signal h makes 
rollover a dominant action, σ(h) = rollover must be part of any equilibrium strategy profile.  Now, 
consider a creditor’s problem when she observes signal m.  Given signal m, each of the three states 
has positive probability, and the posterior probabilities,  Prob(B|m),  Prob(U|m), and  Prob(S|m) can   7
be calculated via Bayes theorem.  Since project success is guaranteed in state S regardless of other 
players’ actions, the action rollover is a dominant action for any player who receives signal m if : 
 Prob(S|m) R  >  λ.            ( 1 )  
Also, since project failure is guaranteed in state B regardless of other players’ actions, foreclose is a 
dominant action for any player who receives signal m if : 
      [Prob(U|m) + Prob(S|m)] R  <  λ.    (2)     
If either (1) or (2) is satisfied, there is a unique equilibrium in the global game.  A creditor’s choice 
is more difficult when both (1) and (2) are violated, i.e., when: 
  P r (|) [ P r (|) P r (|) ] ob S m
R
ob U m ob S m << +
λ
   (3)   
Let Ω be the non-empty set of parameters {πB, πU, πS, rB, rS, λ, R} which satisfy (3).   
When (3) is satisfied, a creditor receiving signal m must additionally assess the probability of 
project success in each of the three feasible states.  Since this probability is exogenously given for 
states B and S, the critical assessment is the probability of success in state U.  Because all creditors 
receive signal m when the state is U, a creditor’s assessment of the probability of project success in 
state U is determined by her belief of what other creditors will do upon receiving signal m.  Since 
other creditors are thinking likewise, this assessment implicitly depends on the entire hierarchy of 
higher order beliefs - beliefs about other creditors’ beliefs, beliefs about others’ beliefs about others’ 
beliefs and so on.  If each creditor believes that others will rollover upon observing m then each 
creditor must assess the probability of success in state U to be one, and if each creditor believes that 
others will foreclose upon observing m then each creditor must assess the probability of success in 
state U to be zero.  In the former case σ(m) = rollover is an equilibrium supported by self-fulfilling 
beliefs and in the latter case σ(m) = foreclose is an equilibrium supported by self-fulfilling beliefs.  
Thus, in the global game, there are two equilibrium strategy profiles each supported by self-fulfilling 
beliefs.  The equilibrium selection problem reappears.  This situation is endemic in global games 
with a finite number of signals because there are discrete jumps in players’ beliefs.    8
We now define an “otherwise identical” game where the notion of risk dominance is well 
defined.  Suppose that only one signal is drawn in accordance with the prior probabilities of the three 
states and the conditional probabilities described in Table I, and this signal is publicly announced.  In 
this otherwise identical game there is no private information, only public information.  Thus, when 
signal m is drawn and publicly announced, fundamental uncertainty is still present, but there is no 
uncertainty about the information of other players.  The game contingent on signal m has common 
knowledge, so it is essentially a game of complete information with payoffs replaced by expected 
payoffs (see Hellwig, 2002).  We call this game PI(m) and depict it below for the case of two 
players. 
Game PI(m) 
 Rollover  Foreclose 
Rollover [Prob(S|m) + Prob(U|m)]R, [Prob(S|m) + Prob(U|m)]R Prob(S|m)R, λ 
Foreclose  λ, Prob(S|m)R   λ, λ 
 
It should be noted that game PI(m) is different from the situation where a player privately observes 
signal m. In the latter case, each of the other players could have received any signal from {l, m} or 
any signal from {h, m}, so there is uncertainty about other players beliefs.  In game PI(m) there is no 
uncertainty about other players’ beliefs.   
When the inequalities in (3) are satisfied, game PI(m) has two equilibria, {rollover, rollover} 
and {foreclose, foreclose}.  The risk-dominant equilibrium is that equilibrium which has the largest 
product of deviation losses.  So {rollover, rollover} is risk dominant if, 
  [Pr ( | ) Pr ( | )] Pr ( | ) ob U m ob S m
R R
ob S m +− > −
λλ
       (4) 
and, {foreclose, foreclose} is risk dominant if the inequality in (4) is reversed.  Which of the two 
equilibria is efficient?   Since message m provides only noisy information about the state, efficiency 
must be assessed from an ex ante perspective.  A creditor’s expected payoff from the {rollover, 
rollover} equilibrium is: 
  π π π π λ SSU B o bh SR o bm SR R o blB Pr ( | ) Pr ( | ) Pr ( | ) + + +    9
Her expected payoff from the {foreclose, foreclose} equilibrium is: 
  π π λ π λ π λ π λ SSU B B o bh SR o bm S o blB o bm B P r( | ) P r( | ) P r( | ) P r( | ) + + + +   







ob mS ob mB R
Pr ( | )




or, equivalently if: 





This last inequality is satisfied for every specification of parameters in the set Ω.  Thus, given the 
structure of our global game, whenever there are multiple equilibria the efficient equilibrium is 
{rollover, rollover}, and the inefficient equilibrium is {foreclose, foreclose}.  If the efficient 
equilibrium is achieved there is no coordination failure in state U. 
  We hypothesize that whenever there are multiple equilibria in the global game, all creditors 
who privately observe signal m will rollover when {rollover, rollover} is the risk dominant 
equilibrium in game PI(m), and will foreclose when {foreclose, foreclose} is the risk dominant 
equilibrium in game PI(m).  There are two plausible alternative hypothesis: (i) Players always 
coordinate on the efficient equilibrium and rollover upon seeing message m and, (ii) Players always 
coordinate on the secure equilibrium and foreclose upon seeing message m. 
  We now show how transparency of information determines which equilibrium is risk 
dominant in the otherwise identical game.  Given the probability specifications in Table 1, it is 
intuitive that any increase in either of the parameters rB, rS, or an increase in both, will increase 
signal transparency.  This claim can be formally proved in terms of Blackwell fineness by 
construction of one conditional probability matrix as a stochastic transformation of the other.  Now, 
since 
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this probability is strictly decreasing in rS  and strictly increasing in rB .  Also since 
 
  Pr ( | ) Pr ( | )
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() ()













this sum of probabilities is also strictly decreasing in rS and strictly increasing in rB .  Therefore, an 
increase in the parameter rS  decreases the left hand side and increases the right hand side of (4).  
Increases in the parameter  rB have the opposite effect, increasing the left hand side and decreasing 
the right hand side of (4).  Therefore, within the set of parameters contained in Ω, an increase in 
transparency caused by an increase in rS will tend to make the {foreclose, foreclose} equilibrium risk 
dominant.  On the other hand, increases in transparency caused by an increase in the parameter rB 
will tend to make the {rollover, rollover} equilibrium risk dominant.  Since the latter is always the 
efficient equilibrium, an increase in transparency could be socially desirable or socially undesirable 
depending on whether, or not, it results in the efficient equilibrium becoming risk dominant.  
  The above proposition depends crucially upon players choosing the predicted risk dominant 
equilibrium in global games with multiple equilibria, regardless of how increased transparency is 
attained and regardless of which equilibrium is more efficient.  The experiments we describe in the 
rest of the paper are designed precisely to test for such behavior.  
 
III. Experimental Design 
Treatments and Predictions 
In the experiment a creditor group consists of eight players, with z=5, meaning that project 
success in state U requires at least five players to roll over. Within a treatment, we hold payoffs, {R, 
λ}, and public information, {πB, πU, πS}, constant, and manipulate risk dominance by changing the 
transparency of private signals through the parameters rB and rS.  The transparency treatment is   11
imposed on two economic parameterizations, an “Optimistic” setting represented by {R, λ}={$0.50, 
$0.20} and {πB, πU, πS}={0.3, 0.2, 0.5}, and a “Pessimistic” setting represented by {R, λ}={$0.50, 
$0.30} and {πB, πU, πS}={0.5, 0.2, 0.2}. Transparency varies from “Low,” {rB, rS}={0.4, 0.4}, to 
“Higher,” {rB, rS}={0.4, 0.9} or {rB, rS}={0.9, 0.4}, to “Highest,” {rB, rS}={0.9, 0.9}.
1 Panels A and 
B of Table 2 summarize the parameters and transparency levels used in the experiment. 
[Table 2] 
  In the Optimistic setting, as described in Panel A of Table 2, the parameter 
λ
R
= 04 . .  With 
low transparency (rB = rS = 0.4), Prob(S|m) = 0.4412 >  
λ
R
, which, from (1), implies that rollover is 
a dominant action for any player who receives message m.   With higher transparency (rB = 0.4, rS = 
0.9), Prob(S|m) = 0.1163 and Prob(U|m) = 0.4651, which, from (3), implies that there are multiple 
equilibira.  But, since Prob(U|m) + Prob(S|m) - 
λ
R
 <  
λ
R
- Prob(S|m), the strategy profile {foreclose, 
foreclose} is risk dominant as argued in (4).  With highest transparency (rB = rS = 0.9), Prob(S|m) = 
0.1786 and Prob(U|m) = 0.7143, which, from (3), again implies that there are multiple equilibira.  
But, this time, since Prob(U|m) + Prob(S|m) - 
λ
R
 >  
λ
R
- Prob(S|m), the strategy profile {rollover, 
rollover} is risk dominant as argued in (4).  Thus in the Optimistic setting, the equilibrium in the 
global game is unique and is supported by dominant strategies when transparency is low, but 
increasing the level of transparency precipitates multiple equilibria.  Given multiple equilibria, the 
risk dominant strategy is inefficient with “higher transparency”, but is efficient with “highest 
transparency.”  
  In the Pessimistic setting, as described in Panel B of Table 2, the parameter 
λ
R
= 06 . .  With 
low transparency (rB = rS = 0.4), Prob(S|m) = 0.2647 and Prob(U|m) = 0.2941, so that their sum <  
                                                 
1 The labels Optimistic, Pessimistic, Low, Higher, and Highest are only used for data reporting purposes. Each 
subject participates in only one economic setting under one level of transparency.   12
λ
R
, which, from (2), implies that foreclose is a dominant action for any player who receives 
message m.  With higher transparency (rB = 0.9, rS = 0.4), Prob(S|m) = 0.4186 and Prob(U|m) = 
0.4651, which, from (3), implies that there are multiple equilibira, and, from (4), the strategy profile 
{rollover, rollover} is risk dominant.  With highest transparency (rB = rS = 0.9), Prob(S|m) = 0.1071 
and Prob(U|m) = 0.7143, which, from (3), again implies that there are multiple equilibira, and, this 
time, the strategy profile {foreclose, foreclose} is risk dominant.  Thus, once again as transparency is 
increased the equilibrium in the global game moves from a unique equilibrium supported by 
dominant strategies to multiple equilibria.  However, in contrast to the Optimistic setting, in the 
Pessimistic setting the risk dominant strategy is efficient with “higher transparency”, but is 
inefficient with “highest transparency.”  
Our equilibrium predictions, together with equilibrium expected payoffs and the expected 
losses from deviations are summarized in Panels A and B of Table 3.  The strategy σ(l) = foreclose, 
σ(m) = rollover, σ(h) = rollover, is labeled Fl, and the strategy σ(l) = foreclose, σ(m) = 
foreclose, σ(h) = rollover, is labeled Fm.  
[Table 3] 
Procedures 
  All six of the experimental manipulations described above were tested at the Bell Laboratory 
for Experimental Economics at the Center for Interuniversity Research and Analysis on 
Organizations (CIRANO), in Montreal, Quebec. In total, 138 subjects participated. Prior to each 
session, participants completed a set of instructions provided in written and oral form, and completed 
interim questions and an overall questionnaire on the procedures. Each person then participated in an 
unspecified number of decision periods, where in each period he or she was randomly grouped with 
seven other participants.
2 The appendix to this paper shows a copy of the instructions and 
                                                 
2 In each decision period subjects were randomly selected to be included in eight-person groups with the 
remaining participants serving as alternates. Subjects were not informed about their status. Each alternate was   13
questionnaire participants completed in the Optimistic, Low transparency cell of the experiment. 
Aside from differences in numerical parameters, all instructions and questionnaires used in the 
experiment were identical. Each session covered approximately two hours and paid participants an 
average of $44.58 (CAD). The following paragraph describes the participants’ information and 
decisions in a session. 
  In each session participants are publicly informed of the payoff structure and the information 
structure they face throughout the session, via both the instructions and computer screen displays. 
Each period, participants were allowed to choose from four feasible decision rules:   
•  Continue always, regardless of your clue (RA); 
•  Withdraw if your clue is low, otherwise continue (FL); 
•  Withdraw if your clue is low or medium, otherwise continue (FM); 
•  Withdraw always, regardless of your clue (FA). 
Each period each participant submits a decision rule to the experimenter prior to receiving his/her 
clue
3 for that period.  Each participant sees his or her decision rule executed ten rounds then receives 
a new clue and resubmits a decision rule. Each time a decision is executed the participant sees only 
his or her own clue and action, and whether the project succeeded or failed. Participants are never 
informed about the true state, or the distribution of decisions in their eight-person groups. So a 
participant with the medium signal can never be certain whether a project outcome occurred because 
of the state of nature or the actions of others.
4 Each session is terminated without warning after ten 
decision rules are submitted and executed over ten rounds. 
                                                                                                                                                      
randomly assigned seven other responders for the purpose of determining project outcome and their payoffs. 
The difference between a group member and an alternate is that the decisions of the alternates did not affect 
project outcomes of any group. This method yielded three groups and zero alternates in four sessions and two 
groups with five alternates in two sessions. 
3 The experiment uses the word “clue” to denote a participant’s private signal, and the words, “continue” and 
“withdraw” for roll over and foreclose, respectively. 
4 This level of incomplete information helps maintain a barrier to tacit communication among participants.   14
IV. Results 
Tables 4 and 5 show the frequency with which each decision rule was the modal choice of 
each participant.  
[TABLES 4 AND 5] 
Table 4 shows the baseline Low transparency settings. In both low transparency settings, 
players have a dominant strategy and the equilibrium is unique.  In the Optimistic setting 23 out of 
24 participants chose Fl (foreclose on the low signal) most frequently. In the Pessimistic setting 19 
out of 21 participants chose Fm (foreclose on the low or medium signal) most frequently. These 
results support the Nash equilibrium prediction for each setting.  
Table 5 shows the results of the Higher and Highest transparency treatments. In these 
treatments there are multiple equilibria.  The efficient equilibrium is always Fl; the risk dominant 
equilibrium varies with the level of transparency and with the level of prior optimism or pessimism.  
Panel A of Table 4 shows 20 out of 24 participants in the Optimistic, Higher transparency treatment 
played the risk-dominant, but inefficient, equilibrium (Fm) most frequently and only 4 played the 
efficient equilibrium (Fl) most frequently. Also in Panel A, 20.5 out of 24 participants in the 
Pessimistic, Higher transparency treatment played the risk-dominant and efficient equilibrium (Fl) 
most frequently. Panel B shows the same pattern for the Highest transparency, Optimistic and 
Pessimistic settings. In the Optimistic, Highest transparency treatment, 19 out of 21 participants most 
frequently played the risk-dominant equilibrium (Fl), while 17 out of 24 participants in the 
Pessimistic, Highest transparency treatment most frequently chose the risk-dominant, but inefficient, 
equilibrium (Fm).  
Table 6 breaks down participants’ decision rule choices by period. Panel A compares 
transparency treatments within the Optimistic setting. Panel B shows the same statistics for the 
Pessimistic setting. Figures 1 through 6 present these data as histograms, showing the number of 
participants selecting each decision rule, by period, in each of the six cells of the experiment.  
[TABLE 6]   15
[Figures 1 – 6] 
In each case, it appears that the risk-dominant decision rule emerges strongly. Of particular 
interest is the observation that in all treatments that have multiple equilibria the efficient equilibrium 
(Fl) is the most frequently selected in the first period.  This might indicate that participants are aware 
that Fl gives the highest expected payoff if all players coordinate on that equilibrium. But that 
choice, and therefore coordination on the efficient equilibrium, is unsustainable when it is not the 
risk dominant equilibrium.   
Table 7 presents summary statistics on the payoff to each strategy. Panel A shows payoffs in 
the Optimistic setting. Panel B shows them in the Pessimistic setting. Panel C summarizes average 
total payoffs for participants in all treatments. 
[TABLE 7] 
Panels A and B of Table 7 show that ex post, the risk-dominant decision rule had the highest payoff 
of any strategy across treatments.  
 
V. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
  In this experiment we study a large group’s ability to coordinate on an efficient strategy 
under different levels of transparency of private information. One clear outcome of this study is that 
greater transparency of information can lead to more coordination failure. Consider the results in the 
Pessimistic economy. When transparency is increased from Low to Higher, most players switch from 
playing the Fm strategy to playing the Fl strategy, moving toward greater coordination. But, when 
transparency is increased additionally to Highest, players tend to switch from Fl to Fm, decreasing 
coordination. On the other hand, in the Optimistic economy, an increase in transparency from Higher 
to Highest caused an increase in the propensity to coordinate, as indicated by the switch from Fm to 
Fl.  In all cells, play converged to the risk-dominant equilibrium. Thus, our results indicate that an 
increase in transparency improves coordination only if it makes the coordination strategy risk 
dominant.  But, if increases in transparency switch the risk dominant-strategy from coordination to   16
no-coordination then such increases in transparency damages economic efficiency. In all 
experimental cells the efficient choice appears strong in early rounds, but it cannot be sustained if it 
is not risk dominant. 
The findings of this experiment have implications for a wide variety of situations where 
group success depends on the maintained confidence of all participants. Firms that are relying 
increasingly on virtual teams might find that research and development projects stagnate more easily 
when decentralized, because of the prevalence of informal local information. Risk dominance would 
imply management should seek out ways to raise confidence in the commitment level of team 
members by increasing the expected cost of holding back resources.  Firms also commonly make use 
of public information, focusing on presenting a strong sense of “top management buy-in” that can 
help to establish optimistic priors on the success of a project. Our study does not offer an explicit 
remedy for coordination failure, but indicates that an increase in the transparency of information will 
not always work.  The interaction between transparency and risk dominance is crucial.   
 
   17
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Table 2 
Signal Distributions, Economic Settings, and Predictions 
 
Panel A: Signal distribution in the optimistic setting for Low, Higher, and Highest levels of 
transparency. 
Optimistic Setting: πB=0.3, πU=0.2, πS=0.5; R=$.50, λ=$0.20 
   
  Low Transparency  Higher Transparency Highest  Transparency 
 { rB,rS}={0.4,0.4} {rB,rS}={0.4,0.9} {rB,rS}={0.9,0.9} 
State  B U S  B U S  B U S 
Prob(l|State)  0.4 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.9 0.0 0.0 
Prob(m|State)  0.6 1.0 .06 0.6 1.0 0.1 0.1 1.0 0.1 
Prob(h|State)  0.0 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.9 0.0 0.0 0.9 
 
Panel B: Signal distribution in the pessimistic setting for Low, Higher, and Highest levels of 
transparency. 
Pessimistic Setting: πB=0.5,πU=0.2,πS=0.3; R=$0.50, λ=$0.30 
 
  Low Transparency  Higher Transparency Highest  Transparency 
 { rB,rS}={0.4,0.4} {rB,rS}={0.9,0.4} {rB,rS}={0.9,0.9} 
State  B U S  B U S  B U S 
Prob(l|State)  0.4 0.0 0.0 0.9 0.0 0.0 0.9 0.0 0.0 
Prob(m|State)  0.6 1.0 .06 0.1 1.0 0.6 0.1 1.0 0.1 




B (Bankrupt): Project fails. 
U (Uncertain): Projects succeeds if at lease 5 of 8 creditors roll over; otherwise it fails. 
S (Solvent): Project succeeds. 
 
Payoffs: 
R: success payoff 
λ: foreclosure payoff 
 
Signals: 
l: Low signal 
m: Medium signal 
h: High signal 
 
Transparency Parameters: 
rB: Probability of signal l in state B. 
rS: Probability of signal h in state S.   19
Table 3 
Signal Distributions, Economic Settings, and Predictions 
 
Panel A: Equilibrium predictions in the optimistic setting for each transparency treatment, 
expected payoff per decision, opportunity cost of selecting Fm(Fl) when all others play Fl(Fm). 
 











Decision  for 
Defecting to Fm 





Defecting to Fl 




Fl  $3.70 -$0.11 $0.10 
Higher: 
{rB,rS}={0.4,0.9} 
Fl  $3.70 -$0.40 -$0.60 
Fm*  $3.40 
Highest: 
{rB,rS}={0.9,0.9} 
Fl*  $4.00 
-$0.70 -$0.30 
Fm  $3.40 
 
 *: Risk-dominant equilibrium 
 
 
Panel B: Equilibrium predictions in the pessimistic setting for each transparency treatment, 
expected payoff per decision, opportunity cost of selecting Fm(Fl) when all others play Fl(Fm). 
 











Decision  for 
Defecting to Fm 





Defecting to Fl 




Fm  $3.20 $0.10 -$0.11 
Higher: 
{rB,rS}={0.9,04} 
Fl*  $3.90 -$0.60 -$0.40 
Fm  $3.20 
Highest: 
{rB,rS}={0.9,0.9} 
Fl  $3.90 
-$0.30 -$0.70 
Fm*  $3.50 
 
 *: Risk-dominant equilibrium   20
Table 4. Number of Participants Who Most Frequently Chose Each Decision Rule in the Low 





(Foreclose if receive Low 
Signal (Fl) is Bayesian Nash) 
Low Transparency 
Pessimistic setting 
(Foreclose if receive Medium 
Signal (Fm) is Bayesian Nash) 
Roll over always (RA)  1 0 
Foreclose if receive  
Low Signal (Fl)  23 2 
Foreclose if Receive Low or 
Medium Signal (Fm)  0 19 
Foreclose Always (FA)  0 0 
 
In the Optimistic setting, the prior probabilities (π) for the three states of nature are as follows: 
Bankrupt (πB = .30), Uncertain (πU = .20), and Solvent (πS = .50). In the Pessimistic setting, the prior 
probabilities (π) for the three states of nature are as follows: Bankrupt (πB = .50), Uncertain (πU = 
.20), and Solvent (πS = .30). The Low Transparency Optimistic setting had 24 participants. The Low 
Transparency Pessimistic setting had 21 participants. If a participant chose more than one strategy 
with equal frequency, half a point is given to each decision rule.  21
Table 5. Number of Participants Who Most Frequently Chose Each Decision Rule in Higher 
Transparency and Highest Transparency Settings 
 




Optimistic setting (Foreclose 
if receive Medium Signal 
(Fm) is the Risk-Dominant 
decision rule) 
Higher Transparency 
Pessimistic setting (Foreclose if 
receive Low Signal (Fl) is the 
Risk-Dominant decision rule) 
Roll over always (RA) 0  0 
Foreclose if receive  
Low Signal (Fl)  4 20.5 
Foreclose if Receive Low 
or Medium Signal (Fm)  20 2.5 
Foreclose Always (FA) 0  1 
 




Optimistic setting (Foreclose 
if receive Low Signal (Fl) is 
the Risk-Dominant decision 
rule) 
Highest Transparency 
Pessimistic setting (Foreclose if 
receive Medium Signal (Fm) is 
the Risk-Dominant decision 
rule) 
Roll over always (RA) 0  0 
Foreclose if receive  
Low Signal (Fl)  19 7 
Foreclose if Receive Low 
or Medium Signal (Fm)  0 17 
Foreclose Always (FA) 0  0 
 
 
In the Optimistic setting, the prior probabilities (π) for the three states of nature are as follows: 
Bankrupt (πB = .30), Uncertain (πU = .20), and Solvent (πS = .50). In the Pessimistic setting, the prior 
probabilities (π) for the three states of nature are as follows: Bankrupt (πB = .50), Uncertain (πU = 
.20), and Solvent (πS = .30). Both the Higher Transparency Optimistic and Pessimistic settings had 
24 participants. The Highest Transparency Optimistic setting had 21 participants, two of whom did 
not respond after set three. The Highest Transparency Pessimistic setting had 24 participants. If a 
participant chose more than one strategy with equal frequency, half a point is given to each decision 
rule. 
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Table 6. Selected Decision Rules by Decision Period 
 
Panel A. Number of Participants Selecting Each Decision Rule by Decision Period in the Optimistic Settings 
 
  Low Transparency Optimistic 
(n= 24 per decision period) 
Prediction: Fl 
Higher Transparency Optimistic 
(n= 24 per decision period) 
Prediction: Fm 
Highest Transparency Optimistic 






























































1  3  15  6 0 1  12  11  0 0  17  3 0 
2  1  18  5 0 1  10  13  0 0  17  4 0 
3  3  20  1 0 0  9 15  0 1  19  1 0 
4  0  23  1 0 0  7 17  0 2  17  0 0 
5  2  21  1 0 0  6 18  0 0  19  0 0 
6  1  21  2 0 1  4 19  0 1  18  0 0 
7  0  23  1 0 1  5 18  0 1  17  1 0 
8  2  21  1 0 0  4 20  0 0  19  0 0 
9  0  23  0 1 1  0 23  0 0  19  0 0 
10  0  24  0 0 1  3 20  0 1  18  0 0 
Tota
l 
12  209  18  1 6  60  174  0 6  180  9 0 
 
In the Optimistic setting, the prior probabilities (π) for the three states of nature are as follows: Bankrupt (πB = .30), Uncertain (πU = .20), and 
Solvent (πS = .50). The Highest Transparency Optimistic setting had 21 participants, however, one participant did not respond in set one and 
two participants did not respond in sets four through ten. 
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Table 6 (Continued) 
 
Panel B.  Number of Participants Selecting Each Decision Rule by Decision Period in the Pessimistic Settings 
 
  Low Transparency Pessimistic 
(n= 21 per decision period) 
Prediction: Fm 
Higher Transparency Pessimistic 
(n= 24 per decision period) 
Prediction: Fl 
Highest Transparency Pessimistic 






























































1  0  10 11 0  0  14 10 0  0  13 9  1 
2  0  11 10 0  0  12 11 1  0  12 12 0 
3  1  8 12  0 0  15  7 1 1  11  11  1 
4  1  4 15  1 0  19  4 1 0  12  12  0 
5  0  5 16  0 0  20  3 1 0  10  14  0 
6  0  4 17  0 0  19  4 1 0  5 19  0 
7  0  3 18  0 0  19  4 1 0  5 19  0 
8  0  2 19  0 0  22  1 1 0  8 16  0 
9  0  1 20  0 0  22  1 1 0  2 22  0 
10  0  0 21  0 0  22  1 1 0  4 20  0 
Tota
l 
2  48  159 1  0  184 46  9  1  82  154 2 
 
In the Pessimistic setting, the prior probabilities (π) for the three states of nature are as follows: Bankrupt (πB = .50), Uncertain (πU = .20), and 
Solvent (πS = .30). The Highest Transparency Pessimistic setting had 24 participants, however, one participant did not respond in set one. 
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 Table 7. Payoffs 
 
Panel A. Frequency of Payoffs and Mean Payoff per Decision Rule in the Optimistic Settings 
 
Decision Rule 
Low Transparency Payoffs 
(n = 2,400 participant  rounds) 
Higher Transparency 
(n = 2,400 participant rounds) 
Highest Transparency  
(n = 2,100 participant rounds) 
$0.00 $0.20 $0.50 Mean Pay $0.00 $0.20  $0.50
Mean 
Pay $0.00  $0.20  $0.50 
Mean 
Pay 
Foreclose always (FA) 0 10 0 0.200 0 0  0 0 0 0 0 0
Foreclose if Low or Medium 
Signal (Fm)   0 156 34 0.254 0 997  733 0.327 0 66 34 0.302
Foreclose if Low Signal (Fl) 411 295 1374 0.359 231 57  322 0.283 48 385 1357 0.422
Roll over always (RA) 48 0 72 0.300 32 0  28 0.233 12 0 48 0.400
Non-responding 0 0 0 0 0 0  0 0 150 0 0 0
 
In the Optimistic setting, the prior probabilities (π) for the three states of nature are as follows: Bankrupt (πB = .30), Uncertain (πU = .20), and 
Solvent (πS = .50).  
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Table 7 (Continued) 
Panel B. Frequency of Payoffs and Mean Payoff per Decision Rule in the Pessimistic Settings 
 
Decision Rule 
Low Transparency Payoffs 
(n = 2,100 participant  rounds) 
Higher Transparency  
(n = 2,400 participant rounds) 
Highest Transparency  
(n = 2,400 participant rounds) 
$0.00 $0.30 $0.50 Mean Pay $0.00 $0.30  $0.50
Mean 
Pay $0.00  $0.30  $0.50 
Mean 
Pay 
Foreclose always (FA) 0 10 0 0.300 0 90  0 0.300 0 20 0 0.300
Foreclose if Low or Medium 
Signal (Fm)   0 1381 209 0.326 0 412  48 0.320 0 1044 476 0.363
Foreclose if Low Signal (Fl) 226 82 172 0.230 127 849  854 0.373 165 296 379 0.331
Roll over always (RA) 16 0 4 0.100 10 0  10 0.250 7 0 3 0.150
Non-responding 0 0 0 0 0 0  0 0 10 0 0 0
 
In the Pessimistic setting, the prior probabilities (π) for the three states of nature are as follows: Bankrupt (πB = .50), Uncertain (πU = .20), and 
Solvent (πS = .30).   26
Table 7 (continued) 
 
Panel C. Total Payoff Per Participant, Excluding $10 Show-Up Fee 
 
   N Min  Max  Mean  S.D. 
Optimistic 
Settings  
Low  Transparency  24  $29.50 $36.80 $34.68 $1.87 
Higher 
Transparency  24  $28.20 $33.80 $31.35 $1.29 
Highest 
Transparency  21  $12.20 $42.60 $38.56 $8.90 
Pessimistic 
Settings 
Low  Transparency  21  $23.40 $33.00 $30.21 $2.18 
Higher 
Transparency  24  $29.80 $38.90 $35.89 $2.10 
Highest 
Transparency  24  $30.90 $36.80 $34.88 $1.65 
 
In the Optimistic setting, the prior probabilities (π) for the three states of nature are as follows: Bankrupt (πB = .30), Uncertain (πU = .20), and 
Solvent (πS = .50). In the Pessimistic setting, the prior probabilities (π) for the three states of nature are as follows: Bankrupt (πB = .50), 
Uncertain (πU = .20), and Solvent (πS = .30). 
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Figure 1 
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Figure 3   28
Highest Transparency Optimistic 
















































































Figure 5   29
Higher Transparency Pessimistic 





































Highest Transparency Pessimistic 































* Risk-dominant equilibrium 









Thank you for participating in this experiment. Your identification number is printed at the top of 
this page.  
 
This experiment is concerned with decision making in a market setting. You are guaranteed to 
receive $10 for showing up on time. By following the instructions carefully and making good 
decisions, you may earn a considerable amount of money in addition to the $10. This additional 
money will range from approximately $20 to $50. The actual amount of additional money that you 
may earn will depend on your decisions and the decisions of other participants. Your money will be 
paid to you in cash after the experiment ends. You will need to sign and date a compensation receipt 
form before you receive your payment. 
 
Throughout the experiment, please observe the following rules during the instructions and 
experiment:  
 
1.  Do not talk to any other participant at any time. The screens between the participants are to 
maintain privacy. 
 
2.  You will use your mouse to select decisions during the experiment. Do not use your mouse 
or keyboard to play around with the software running on your computer. If you 
unintentionally or intentionally close the software program running on your computer, 
you will be asked to leave. If this happens, you will receive only your $10 fee for 
showing up.  
 
3.  If you have any questions, raise your hand. An experimenter will answer your questions 
privately. 
 
4.  At the end of the instructions, you will take a short quiz to verify that you understand the 
experimental procedures.  
 
 
For easy reference, your computer screen will display the tables and figures in these instructions. 
Right now, your computer screen should be blank.   31
Your Role in the Experiment 
 
Throughout the experiment, you will be randomly grouped with 7 other participants. You and the 
other participants will each be a creditor to a company to whom you have lent money. The company 
has borrowed your money in order to fund a project. Each creditor (including you) will decide 
whether to (1) Continue to invest his or her money in the company until the project is complete, or 
(2) Withdraw his or her money before the project is complete.  
 
The experiment will consist of multiple sets. Each set has 10 rounds. For example, two sets include a 
total of 20 rounds, and 40 sets include a total of 400 rounds. You will not know how many sets will 




As shown in Table 1, your payoffs in each round will depend on your decision (Continue or 
Withdraw) and whether the project succeeds or fails. When you make your decision, you will not 
know for certain whether the project will succeed or fail. Please take a moment to review Table 1: 
 
 
Table 1: Payoff Schedule (Per Round) 
 
  Project Succeeds  Project Fails 
You Continue  $0.50 $0.00 
You Withdraw  $0.20 $0.20 
 
Table 1 appears in the upper left corner of your computer screen. 
 
 
Below, please write down your answers to the following questions on this page about Table 1. In a 
few moments the experimenter will review the correct answers with you.   
 
1. If you withdrew your money in an experimental round, how much money would  
you receive? ________________________________________________________ 
 
 
2. If you continued to invest your money in an experimental round, what would  
your payoff depend on? _______________________________________________ 
 
__________________________________________________________________ 
   32
Project Success or Failure 
There are three possible states of nature: Solvent, Uncertain, and Bankrupt. Project success is 
guaranteed when the state of nature is Solvent. Project failure is guaranteed when the state of nature 
is Bankrupt. When the state of nature is Uncertain, the project succeeds only if at least 5 creditors 
continue to invest. Only one state of nature will occur in each experimental round. Table 2 shows the 
percentage of times each state of nature will occur, and the project outcome for each state of nature. 
Table 2 appears below Table 1 in the upper left corner of your computer screen. Please take a 
moment to review this table:  
 
Table 2: Percentage of times each state of nature will occur and the project outcome for 
each state of nature.  
 
State of nature 
Percentage of times each state 
of nature will occur  Project Outcome 
Solvent  50%  Success is guaranteed 
Uncertain 20% 
Project succeeds if at least  
5 out of 8 creditors  
continue to invest 
Bankrupt  30%  Failure is guaranteed 
 
Table 2 appears below Table 1 in the upper left corner of your computer screen. 
 
Below, please write down your answers to the following questions on this page about Table 2. In a 
few moments the experimenter will review the correct answers with you.  
  
1. If you were to participate in this experiment for 100 rounds, how many times would you expect  
 
A. the Solvent state of nature to occur?    ________ times 
B. the Bankrupt state of nature to occur?  ________ times 
C. the Uncertain state of nature to occur? ________ times 
 
2. If the state of nature is Solvent and 4 out of 8 creditors continued to invest their money, what 
would be the project outcome? (check one:)   _____ Success _____ Failure 
 
3. If the state of nature is Bankrupt and 6 out of 8 creditors continued to invest their money, what 
would be the project outcome? (check one:)   _____ Success _____ Failure 
 
4. If the state of nature is Uncertain and 6 out of 8 creditors continued to invest their money, what 
would be the project outcome? (check one:)   _____ Success _____ Failure 
 
5. If the state of nature is Uncertain and 4 out of 8 creditors continued to invest their money, what 
would be the project outcome? (check one:)   _____ Success _____ Failure   33
Your Clues about the State of Nature 
 
Each experimental round, a computer will randomly select one of the three states of nature based on 
the percentages shown in Table 2. You will not observe which state of nature the computer has 
selected. Instead, you will observe one of three clues (Low, Medium, or High) about the state of 
nature. Each creditor will observe only his or her clue. After you receive your clue, you will decide 
whether to continue to invest or withdraw your money. Figure 1 shows the clues and project 
outcomes for each state of nature.  
 
Figure 1 appears below and on a separate sheet of paper for your convenient reference. Please 



























Four or f ewer  
creditors continue









States of Nature Clues Project Outcomes  34
Below, please write down your answers to the following questions on this page about Figure 1. In a 
few moments the experimenter will review the correct answers with you. 
 





d. cannot be determined with certainty 
  





d. cannot be determined with certainty 
 





d. cannot be determined with certainty 
 
4. If you receive the Low clue,  
A. is it possible that others will receive the Medium clue?     _____ Yes _____ 
No 
B. is it possible that others will receive the High clue?     _____ Yes _____ No 
5. If you receive the Medium clue,  
A. is it possible that others will receive the Low clue?      _____ Yes _____ No 
B. is it possible that others will receive the High clue?      _____ Yes _____ No 
6. If you receive the High clue,  
A. is it possible that others will receive the Low clue?      _____ Yes _____ No 
B. is it possible that others will receive the Medium clue?      _____ Yes _____ 
No 
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Making Your Decision to Continue or Withdraw 
You will choose a decision rule to indicate your decisions in the experiment. Your decision rule will 
specify which clues will lead you to continue to invest your money and which clues will lead you to 
withdraw your money. After you receive your private clue in an experimental round, your decision 
rule will be executed by the computer. You can choose one of four decision rules: 
  
Decision Rule 
Select a Decision Rule by Clicking the Appropriate Box 
 
 Continue always, regardless of your clue 
 
 Withdraw if your clue is Low, otherwise continue 
 
 Withdraw if your clue is Low or Medium, otherwise continue 
 
 Withdraw always, regardless of your clue 
 
 
The decision rules are displayed in the upper right corner of your computer screen. During the 
experiment you will indicate your choice by clicking on the appropriate box. 
 
Choose your decision rule carefully because it will remain in effect for 10 experimental rounds. 
After that, you may revise your decision rule for the next set of 10 rounds, and so on.  
 
How Your Decision Rule Will Be Executed 
Your decision rule will be executed in the following manner for each experimental round: 
 
1.  The computer will use the percentages in Table 2 and Figure 1 to generate a state of nature 
and private clues for each creditor.  
 
2.  The computer will compare your private clue with your decision rule to determine whether 
you continue to invest or withdraw your money for that round.  
 
3.  The computer will tabulate how many creditors continue to invest, determine whether the 
project fails or succeeds, and calculate your payoff for that round.  
 
4.  After 10 such rounds, you may revise your decision rule for the next 10 rounds.  
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Below, please write down your answers to the following questions on this page about the decision 
rules. In a few moments the experimenter will review the correct answers with you. 
 
1. For how many experimental rounds will your decision rule apply? ______ rounds 
 
2. Suppose you selected the decision rule which states “Withdraw if your clue is Low, otherwise 
continue.”  
 
A. If you receive the Medium clue, what would your decision be?  
_____ Continue  _____ Withdraw 
 
B. If you receive the Low clue, what would your decision be?  
_____ Continue  _____ Withdraw 
 
3. Suppose you selected the decision rule which states “Withdraw if your clue is Low or Medium, 
otherwise continue.”  
 
A. If you receive the Low clue, what would your decision be?  
_____ Continue  _____ Withdraw 
 
B. If you receive the High clue, what would your decision be?  
_____ Continue  _____ Withdraw 
 
C. If you receive the Medium clue, what would your decision be?  
_____ Continue  _____ Withdraw 
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Market Activity and Payoff Report 
 
The middle of your computer screen will report the market activity and payoff information in Table 
3. This table will be displayed as shown below. For this example, suppose that you chose the 
decision rule which states “Withdraw if your clue is Low, otherwise continue” and that Round 4 has 
just been completed. Please take a few moments to verify that you understand the information in 
Table 3: 
 





































Table 3 is displayed in the middle of your computer screen and will be updated after each 
experimental round. 
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Set Choices and Payoffs 
 
After each experimental round, the computer will report your Set Choices and Payoffs in Table 4. 
This table will appear at the bottom of your computer screen. The table will be displayed as follows:  
Table 4: Set Choices and Payoffs 
 









A brief description of 
your decision rule will 
appear in this column 
Your payoffs for the 
most recent set will be 
updated in this column 
after each experimental 
round. 
Your cumulative 
payoff for the 
experiment will be 
updated in this column 
after each 
experimental round. 
2      
etc.      
 
Table 4 is displayed at the bottom of your computer screen.   39
Summary of Experimental Procedures 
 
The experiment consists of multiple sets of 10 rounds. You will not know how many sets will be 
played until the experiment ends. Each set of 10 rounds will consist of the following steps:  
 
1.  You will be randomly and anonymously grouped with seven other creditors. For each set of 
10 rounds you will be grouped with a different set of seven creditors. If the number of 
creditors exceeds an exact multiple of 8, the computer will randomly select the remaining 
creditors to serve as alternates for that set. The computer will randomly select different 
alternates for each set. Each alternate will be randomly grouped with seven other creditors in 
order to receive payoffs as fully participating creditors.  
 
2.  You will privately select your decision rule for the entire set of 10 rounds.  
 
3.  In each of the 10 rounds, the computer will select the state of nature and your private clue. 
Your investment decision will be executed on your behalf based on your decision rule. 
 
4.  For each round, your payoff will be computed based on your investment decision and 
whether the project succeeded or failed.  
 
5.  At the end of each round, you will receive a Market Activity and Payoff Report. 
 
6.  Steps 3 –5 will be repeated for each of the 10 rounds in the set.   
 
Limited Time to Make Decisions 
 
Before the first set of 10 rounds commences, you will have 2 minutes to select a decision rule. 
For subsequent sets, you will have 1 minute to select a decision rule. You may change your 
selection any time during this allotted time period. Your computer monitor will display a 
reminder message thirty seconds before your allotted decision time expires. When the allotted 
time expires, the computer will execute your decision rule on your behalf for 10 rounds. If you 
fail to select a decision rule within the allotted time for a particular set, you will not participate in 
that particular set and your payoff for that set will be $0.00.  
 
Conclusion of the Experiment 
 
At the conclusion of the experiment, an experimenter will ask you to please quietly remain 
seated. To receive your earnings, you must first hand in your instructions booklet (including 
the questionnaire on the following pages) and sign a payment receipt form. 
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ID #: ______________ 
 
QUESTIONNAIRE ON EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURES 
 
The amount of money you will earn in this experiment will depend on how well you understand 
the market procedures. Please take the following quiz to verify that you understand the 
procedures. Raise your hand when you are finished. The experiment will begin after each 
participant completes the quiz.  
 
1. In an experimental round, how much money will you earn if you continue to invest your 
money in the company and  
 
a. the project succeeds?     $__________ 
 
b. the project fails?    $__________ 
 
2. In an experimental round, how much money will you earn if you withdraw your money from 
the company and 
 
a. the project succeeds?     $__________ 
 
b. the project fails?    $__________ 
 
3. For an experimental round, when will you find out whether the project actually succeeded or 
failed?(circle one answer) 
 
a.  At the beginning of the experimental round 
b.  When you receive your private clue about the state of nature in that experimental round. 
c.  When your decision rule determines whether you will continue or withdraw your money in 
that experimental round. 
d.  When the Market Activity and Payoff Report is updated in Table 3 in the middle of your 
computer screen.  
 
4. Complete the following table, assuming that you chose the decision rule “Withdraw if your clue is 
Low or Medium, otherwise continue”, 6 out of 8 creditors in your group continued to invest, and the 
state of nature was Uncertain: 
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5. Complete the following table, assuming that you chose the decision rule “Withdraw if your clue is 
Low, otherwise continue”, 4 out of 8 creditors in your group continued to invest, and the state of 
nature was Uncertain:  
 














    
 
6. Complete the following table, assuming that you chose the decision rule “Withdraw if your clue is 
Low, otherwise continue”, 6 out of 8 creditors in your group continued to invest, and the state of 
nature was Bankrupt: 














    
 
7. Complete the following table, assuming that you chose the decision rule “Withdraw always”,  6 
out of 8 creditors in your group continued to invest, and the state of nature was Solvent:  
 














    
 
8. Complete the following table, assuming that you chose the decision rule “Continue always”, five 
creditors continued to invest, and the state of nature was Bankrupt: 
 














    
 
AFTER THE EXPERIMENT ENDS, YOU WILL BE ASKED TO HAND IN YOUR 
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